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The deferred acceptance algorithm is often used to allocate indivisible objects when monetary transfers are not allowed. We provide two characterizations of agent-proposing deferred acceptance allocation rules. Two new axioms-individually rational monotonicity and weak Maskin monotonicity-are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008470805
Hatfield and Milgrom [Hatfield, John William, Milgrom, Paul R., 2005. Matching with contracts. Amer. Econ. Rev. 95, 913-935] present a unified model of matching with contracts, which includes the standard two-sided matching and some package auction models as special cases. They show that the...
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We consider random assignment of multiple indivisible objects. When each agent receives one object, [Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H., 2001. A new solution to the random assignment problem. Journal of Economic Theory 100, 295-328] show that the probabilistic serial mechanism is ordinally efficient,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005175299
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We introduce the class of anti-coordination games. A symmetric two-player game is said to have the anti-coordination property if, for any mixed strategy, any worst response to the mixed strategy is in the support of the mixed strategy. Every anti-coordination game has a unique symmetric Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005050958
In two-sided matching markets, stable mechanisms are vulnerable to various kinds of manipulations. This paper investigates conditions for the student-optimal stable mechanism (SOSM) and the college-optimal stable mechanism (COSM) to be immune to manipulations via capacities and pre-arranged...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005458970
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We study the effect of different school choice mechanisms on schools' incentives for quality improvement. To do so, we introduce the following criterion: A mechanism respects improvements of school quality if each school becomes weakly better whenever that school improves and thereby becomes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010737030
Accommodating couples has been a longstanding issue in the design of centralized labor market clearinghouses for doctors and psychologists, because couples view pairs of jobs as complements. A stable matching may not exist when couples are present. This paper's main result is that a stable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010737039