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Designing random allocation mechanisms : theory and applications

Budish, Eric B.; Che, Yeon-Koo; Kojima, Fuhito; … - In: The American economic review 103 (2013) 2, pp. 585-623

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009759432

Matching with couples : stability and incentives in large markets

Kojima, Fuhito; Pathak, Parag A.; Roth, Alvin E. - In: The quarterly journal of economics 128 (2013) 4, pp. 1585-1632

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010236957

The "Boston" school-choice mechanism : an axiomatic approach

Kojima, Fuhito; Ünver, M. Utku - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 55 (2014) 3, pp. 515-544

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010346082

Investment incentives in labor market matching

Hatfield, John William; Kojima, Fuhito; Kominers, Scott Duke - In: The American economic review 104 (2014) 5, pp. 436-441

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010390936

The "Boston" school-choice mechanism

Kojima, Fuhito; Ünver, M. Utku - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008665565

Essays on matching and market design

Kojima, Fuhito - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011399102

Incentives and stability in large two-sided matching markets

Kojima, Fuhito; Pathak, Parag A. - In: The American economic review 99 (2009) 3, pp. 608-627

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003863182

Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism

Kojima, Fuhito; Manea, Mihai - In: Journal of economic theory 145 (2010) 1, pp. 106-123

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003946334

Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts

Hatfield, John William; Kojima, Fuhito - In: Games and economic behavior 67 (2009) 2, pp. 745-749

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003909330

Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition

Kamada, Yuichiro; Kojima, Fuhito - In: Theoretical Economics 13 (2018) 2, pp. 761-793

Distributional constraints are common features in many real matching markets, such as medical residency matching, school admissions, and teacher assignment. We develop a general theory of matching mechanisms under distributional constraints. We identify the necessary and sufficient condition on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010043