bad. In a market setting with multiple consumers per expert, a cross-consumer externality arises: one consumer's payment … raises the expert's income, which makes the non-selfish part of preferences more important and thereby induces the expert to … provides a novel rationale for the wide-spread use of price regulation and licensing in real-world markets for expert services. …

theoretically to be effective in mitigating fraudulent expert behavior. We analyze whether this positive result carries over to a …

theoretically to be effective in mitigating fraudulent expert behavior. We analyze whether this positive result carries over to when …

Markets for expert services are characterized by information asymmetries between experts and consumers. We analyze the …

Moral hazard in expert diagnoses is more complicated in credence goods markets because ex-post verification of service … optimality is usually not possible. We provide an experimental framework to investigate expert and consumer behavior as well as …, varying in their necessary effort to diagnose consumers. We examine how subjects react to expert qualification and the …

We study optimal direct mechanisms for a credence goods expert who can be altruistic or spiteful. The expert has …