This paper reviews a framework for numerically analyzing dynamic interactions in imperfectly competitive industries. The framework dates back to Ericson and Pakes [1995. Review of Economic Studies 62, 53–82], but it is based on equilibrium notions that had been available for some time before,...

It is shown that the equilibrium notion of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) does have predictive power for standard models of Bertrand competition. This is in contrast to a recent claim by Qin and Stuart (1997). The claim is based on the observation that the solution concept ESS behaves...

In a coordination game such as the Battle of the Sexes, agents can condition their plays on external signals that can, in theory, lead to a Correlated Equilibrium that can improve the overall payoffs of the agents. Here we explore whether boundedly rational, adaptive agents can learn to...

In this paper we look at a new way to combine both quantity precommitment and price competition in a dynamic games framework. In each period players choose to invest in production capacities for the next period and also engage in a price competition. Production is free up to capacity and has...

We formally define Markov quantal response equilibrium (QRE) and prove existence for all finite discounted dynamic stochastic games. The special case of logit Markov QRE constitutes a mapping from precision parameter ... to sets of logit Markov QRE. The limiting points of this correspondence are...

This article analyses the ability of the learning firms in a Cournot oligopoly to discover market solutions more collusive that the Cournot equilibrium (CE). We start from the results of Vallée and Yildizoglu (2009) and of Alos-Ferrer (2004), and qualify the role of random experimenting, social...

It is a very well-known result that in terms of evolutionary stability the long-run outcome of a Cournot oligopoly market with finitely many firms approaches the perfectly competitive Walrasian market outcome (Vega-Redondo, 1997). However, in this paper we show that an asymmetric structure in...

We study the stochastic effect of resource exploration in dynamic Cournot models of exhaustible resources, such as oil. We first treat the case of a monopolist who may undertake costly exploration to replenish his diminishing reserves. We then consider a stochastic game between such an...

We show that Miller and Pazgal.s (2001) model of strategic delegation, in which managerial incentives are based upon relative performance, is affected by a non-existence problem which has impact on the price equilibrium. The undercutting incentives generating this result are indeed similar to...