We investigate how the manager of a publicly traded firm may distort operational decisions to signal product quality when he/she receives equity-based incentives offered by shareholders. We show that the shareholders' optimal incentive contract induces the manager to engage in wasteful actions....

We study a strategic information management problem in the export-processing trade, where the buyer controls the raw material input and sales and the producer is responsible for production. The production is vulnerable to random yield risk. The producer can exert a costly effort to acquire the...

This research investigates how to design procurement mechanisms for assortment planning. A retailer buys directly from a manufacturer who possesses private information about the per unit variable cost and per variety setup cost. We first develop a screening model to assist the retailer in...

Demand forecasting has recently become a prime candidate for outsourcing. This research investigates how to design an information quality incentive (IQI) mechanism to manage the quality of demand forecasting in a multi-stage model where the company uses a forecaster's demand forecast to manage...

This article revisits a classic mechanism design problem for a principal who procures two complementary goods from a single agent. Although the final product requires both goods to function properly, the principal may purchase unbalanced quantities and discard some of the output. The wasteful...

We consider a multicomponent, single-product assemble-to-order (ATO) system that faces frequent, component-based technology innovations. For each component, there are two technologies with overlapping life cycles coexisting in the market. All cost parameters associated with each technology...