How should executives strategically allocate talent? Organizations have recently adopted talent marketplaces to address job assignment and internal mobility. We formalize the worker-to-division matching problem, in which executives match workers and divisions, and face agents' preferences as the...

We develop a principal/agent model for matching agents in two-sided assignments. A principal has preferences over all agents' assignments, and agents have privately-known preferences about their own match (but are indifferent about others'). Unhappy agents can quit, but the principal can stop...

A principal often needs to match agents to perform coordinated tasks, but agents can quit or slack off if they dislike their match. We study two prevalent approaches for matching within organizations: Centralized assignment by firm leaders and self-organization through market-like mechanisms. We...

In this paper, we document the extent to which the sample of the Survey of Income and Program Participation that is matched to the Social Security Administration’s administrative earnings records is nationally representative. We conclude that the match bias is small, so selection is not a...