One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or...

In bargaining theory a usual assumption is either that of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions or that of continuous preferences. Recently we considered in Glycopantis a bargaining model which breaks away from this traditional treatment by employing lexicographic preferences of a...

The supply of information, particularly of bad news, in an agency relationship is a sensitive issue. We employ a game theory approach to investigate conflicts in the particular case of the doctor-patient relationship when information affects the emotions of patients. The doctor does not know the...

The paper explains by means of two detailed examples that Nash Equilibria in zero-sum games can be obtained through the application of linear programming and maximin calculations. It also discusses, for the same purpose, the application of Kuhn-Tucker theory. In particular, with respect to the...

We consider zero-sum and a non zero-sum games of two players with generalized, not necessarily linear, utility functions and infinite, compact pure strategy spaces. Emphasis is given to comparisons with results obtained in mathematical theorems. The games chosen make specific points in relation...

In his Nash equilibrium paper, Glicksberg states that the payoff functions are continuous. Such a function is defined on the product of mixed strategies, which are the Borel probability measures on a compactum, endowed with the product of the weak topologies. The continuity property is used in...

We point out several conceptual difficulties of the rational expectations equilibrium concept. In particular we show that such an equilibrium need not be incentive compatible and need not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium . A comparison of rational expectations equilibria with...

The private core of an economy with differential information, (Yannelis (1991)), is the set of all state-wise feasible and private information measurable allocations which cannot be dominated, in terms of ex ante expected utility functions, by state-wise feasible and private information...

In the context of differential information economies, with and without free disposal, we consider the concepts of Radner equilibrium, rational expectations equilibrium, private core, weak fine core and weak fine value. We look into the possible implementation of these concepts as perfect...