In this paper we examine how trade liberalization affects collusive stability in the context of multimarket interactions. The model we consider is a segmented-markets duopoly in which price-setting firms pool their incentive constraints across markets to sustain their most collusive outcome. We...

There is a large literature on the impact of price-matching and price-beating guarantees (low-price guarantees) on competition. Existing studies typically employ static models and the results are sensitive to modeling assumptions such as the type of guarantees, consumer hassle costs and consumer...

In this paper we provide game theoretic support for the results of the kinked demand curve. By analyzing an infinitely repeated game where unit costs fluctuate stochastically between a low and a high state over time and where firms follow a price-matching punishment strategy, we demonstrate that...

This paper studies evolution of firms' behavior in a networked Bertrand oligopoly market, in which firms who are located on vertices of a network compete in price with their neighbors. This network model is also applied to a market with multi-dimensionally differentiated products. In a...

How does the organizational form of loan syndicates evolve and what are the effects on price collusion? We develop a novel measure of distance in lending expertise among syndicate lenders, and relate this novel measure to the organizational form of loan syndicates and loan pricing. Studying the...

We use unique data sets with round-the-clock posted fares and a regression discontinuity design to identify price discrimination in advance-purchase discounts. Price discrimination increases fares by 14% between two and one week before departure, and by 7.6% between three and two weeks to...

We suggest a price signaling strategy that offers a microfoundation for the process leading to tacit collusion under multimarket contact, even in cases where previous theoretical explanations fail. It rests on the assumptions that firms can communicate collusive intentions solely through their...

Amongst the wealth of concerns raised by Artificial Intelligence (“AI”), one is the risk that the deployment of algorithmic pricing agents on markets will increase occurrences of tacit collusion by orders of magnitude, and well beyond the oligopoly setting where such markets failures have...