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Investment decisions and effort incentives in the presence of uncertain ability
Anton, Björn - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008749998
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A strategic mediator who is biased in the same direction as the expert can improve information transmission
Mechtenberg, Lydia; Münster, Johannes - In: Economics letters 117 (2012) 2, pp. 490-492
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009675180
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Behavioral biases and the representative agent
Jouini, Elyès; Napp, Clotilde - In: Theory and decision : an international journal for … 73 (2012) 1, pp. 97-123
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009614000
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Status characteristics, cognitive bias, and incentives in teams
Oxoby, Robert J. - In: The journal of socio-economics 31 (2002) 3, pp. 301-316
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001746658
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Prudence with Biased Experts : Ratings Agencies & Regulators
Levy, David M. - 2010
upward bias was common knowledge. The requirement was attacked by a Chicago economist, Melchior Palyi, on philosophical … financed a massive study of bond ratings which developed a technical response to remove the bias. The study required a trade …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013137561
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Prudence with Biased Experts : Ratings Agencies & Regulators
Levy, David M. - 2010
upward bias was common knowledge. The requirement was attacked by a Chicago economist, Melchior Palyi, on philosophical … financed a massive study of bond ratings which developed a technical response to remove the bias. The study required a trade …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013137832
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Cognitive Biases and the Representative Agent
Jouini, Elyes - 2015
result, we show that an agent with a probability weighting function as in Cumulative Prospect Theory (resp. an ambiguity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013039075
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Optimal Delegation Under Unknown Bias : The Role of Concavity
Tanner, Noam - 2019
A principal is uncertain of an agent's preferences and cannot provide monetary transfers. The principal, however, does control the discretion granted to the agent. In this paper, we provide a simple characterization of when it is optimal for the principal to screen by offering different terms of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012894211
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Online Appendix : Persuading the Principal to Wait
Orlov, Dmitry - 2019
dynamic commitment, this promise is credible only if the agent's bias is small; otherwise, he pipets information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012862193
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The role of information accuracy and justification in bonus allocations
Hermans, Tim; Cools, Martine; Van den Abbeele, Alexandra - In: Journal of management control 32 (2021) 2, pp. 197-223
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012589144