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expertise are more likely to be conservative, but their bias is less severe. Our analysis shows that board's commitment power … and bias are substitutes. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014506645
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This note reconsiders communication between an informed expert and an uninformed decision maker with a strategic mediator in a discrete Crawford and Sobel (1982) setting. We show that a strategic mediator may improve communication even when he is biased into the same direction as the expert. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014183132
based on the interplay between two types of agency costs: shirking on information production and policy bias. Principals … mitigate the resulting bias in the agents' decisions. The availability of such review mechanisms encourages principals to … employ more extreme agents. We apply the theory to explain various features of the administrative state. In contrast to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014161869
Some agents are more accurate than others in estimating the best policy. The more accurately an agent estimates a policy's effects, the more he will resist biases, such as bribes from a special interest. Thus, a special interest needs to pay a larger bribe to an accurate agent than to an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014108256
We document outcome bias in situations where an agent makes risky financial decisions for a principal. In three …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013440190
A long-standing puzzle is how overconfidence can persist in settings characterized by repeated feedback. This paper studies managers who participate repeatedly in a high-powered tournament incentive system, learning relative performance each time. Using reduced form and structural methods we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014311540
result, we show that an agent with a probability weighting function as in Cumulative Prospect Theory (resp an ambiguity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014045904
information at the principal’s advantage, we test experimentally the principal’s willingness to bias (overestimate or under …) principals do bias information, ii) agents trust the cheap-talk messages they receive and adjust their effort accordingly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014190000
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