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Coordination after gains andlosses: Is prospect theory’s valuefunction predictive for games?

Schade, Christian; Schröder, Andreas; Krause, Kai Oliver - Universität <Berlin, Humboldt-Universität> / … - 2010

rivalry in our incentivized experiments. Females alsochose to play far more mixed strategies than males indicating some …Wir präsent ieren eine Verhaltensvariante der Spieltheorie, die auf der Wertfunktion der Prospekttheorie …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009302578

Will investors adapt their investment behavior whenfaced with a change in information feedback and investmentflexibility?

Zeisberger, Stefan; Langer, Thomas; Weber, Martin - Institut für Schweizerisches Bankwesen <Zürich> - 2011

this gap we conduct the first experiment on MLA in which thedegree of myopia is manipulated to change over time. Our …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009354101

Risk Taking in Winner-Take-AllCompetition

Kräkel, Matthias; Nieken, Petra; Przemeck, Judith - Universität <Bonn> / Wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher … - 2008

game is solved theoreticallyand then tested by using laboratory experiments. We find threeeffects that determine risk …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009354148

(Un)Reliable Concessions in Static andDynamic Bargaining Experiments

Fischer, Sven; González Morales, Luis G.; Güth, Werner - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005

A two-persons bargaining problem often consists of initially incompatible demands that can be unilaterally reduced by sequential concessions. In a 2 x 2 x 2-factorial design we distinguish between reliable and unreliable concessions, between a static and dynamic settings and between symmetric...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866602

Inequality Aversion in Ultimatum Gameswith Asymmetric Conflict Payoffs

Fischer, Sven - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005

Assuming inequality averse subjects as modeled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or in the ERC model by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) in ultimatum games with asymmetric conflict payoffs allows to make predictions especially concerning responder acceptance thresholds. These predictions are tested in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866680

Strategic Delay and Rational Imitation in the Laboratory

Ziegelmeyer, Anthony; Boun My, Kene; VERGNAUD, JEAN; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

This paper investigates market failures due to strategic delays. We test experimentally a discrete model of dynamic investment, where two privately informed agents have an option to invest at the time of their choice in the presence of waiting costs. The equilibrium outcome of ourexperimental...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866694

Laboratory Bilateral Gift Exchange:The Impact of Loss Aversion

Dittrich, Dennis; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

The employment relationship is characterized by incomplete contracts. Labor contracts often take the form of a fixed wage without explicit performance incentives meaning that workers have a large degree of discretion over effort levels. As a consequence, an employee’s general jobattitude...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866697

How to Preserve a Fortune: An Experimental Comparison of Foundations and Direct Transfers to the Heir

Güth, Werner; Koschmieder, Kurt-Dieter; Levati, Maria … - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von …

Direct transfers allow heirs to freely use what has been passed on to them. Bequeathers who do not trust their descendants to make proper use of the fortune may prefer investing it in a safe foundation, thereby limiting their descendants’ autonomy. In our study we compare experimentally these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866700

Cooperative Networks: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Pantz, Katinka; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

the results of two experiments. The ¯rst implemented environmentfollows the standard procedures for the voluntary … suf-¯cient to induce cooperative outcomes. In the second experiment we introduce the pairwisecommitment mechanism and we … observe aggregate cooperation rates beyond those observedin the ¯rst experiment whatever the monitoring cost but also beyond …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866705

“One Man, One Dollar”?Examining the equalization argument in support ofcampaign contribution limits

Vanberg, Christoph - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005

Arguably the most important campaign finance regulations in U.S. federal elections are limitsimposed on the amount that an individual or organization may donate to a federal campaign. Suchcontribution limits are advocated on two separate grounds. The first is that they prevent corruption,the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866710