Showing 241 - 250 of 367
We analyze the formation of self-enforcing international environmental agreements under the assumption that countries announce their participation either simultaneously or sequentially. It is shown that a sequential formation process opens up possibilities for strategic behavior of countries...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312488
Many researchers have found game theory a useful method for analyzing internationalenvironmental problems. However, game theory has been criticized for being too theoretical,abstracting from too many practical problems and being based on very specific assumptions.This article tries to qualify...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868366
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000998751
This paper analyses stability of coalitions for greenhouse gas abatement under different sharing rules applied to the gains from cooperation. We use a 12-region model to examine internal and external stability of coalitions. We determine and compare stable coalitions under different surplus...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012760864
This paper analyses the formation of international environmental agreements (IEAs) under uncertainty, focusing on the role of learning and risk aversion. It bridges two strands of literature: one focused on the role learning for the success of IEA formation when countries are risk neutral and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013059058
Several studies found ancillary benefits of environmental policy to be of considerable size. These additional private benefits imply not only higher cooperative but also noncooperative abatement targets. However, beyond these largely undisputed important quantitative effects, there are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012711005
Transfers often play a crucial role in encouraging participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs). However, the economic literature on transfers is very limited and results achieved so far do not exploit the full potential of transfers for successful treaty-making. Therefore, in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012713422
We analyze how geoengineering, associated with a high risk of collateral damages, affects the governance architecture of climate agreements. We clarify under which conditions signatories to a climate agreement can avoid that non-signatories deploy risky geoengineering. We correct and qualify the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013292759
Key environmental issues, such as biodiversity and climate change, have in recent years become more pressing than ever. Where the critical papers in the early 1990s explained the difficulties of cooperation in tackling transboundary environmental problems, later works have analyzed the various...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852183
Several studies found ancillary benefits of the provision of public goods to be of considerable size. If these additional private benefits were noticed, they would imply not only higher cooperative but also non-cooperative provision levels. However, beyond these largely undisputed important...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010987501