Descending mechanisms for procurement (or, ascending mechanisms for selling) have been well‐recognized for their simplicity from the viewpoint of bidders — they require less bidder sophistication as compared to sealed‐bid mechanisms. In this study, we consider procurement under each of two...

A buyer faces a two-dimensional mechanism design problem for awarding a project to one among a set of contractors, each of whom is privately informed about his cost and his estimate of an a priori random non-cost attribute. The winning contractor realizes his non-cost attribute upon the...

To stay competitive, firms regularly invest in innovation by supporting internal capital projects (funded and executed in-house) that explore new products and operational improvements. Each year, in a highly competitive process, managers from different functional units of the firm submit...

We consider a principal who periodically offers a fixed, binary, and costly non-monetary reward to agents endowed with private information, to incentivize the agents to invest effort over the long run. An agent's output, as a function of his effort, is a priori uncertain and is worth a fixed...