In this paper we measure experienced guilt in a prisoner’s dilemma experiment with pre-play communication. We find that feelings of guilt only arise in the case of unilateral defection and that they are stronger when players have mutually agreed to cooperate. We also find that fining...

We study a society of agents where individual incentives conflict with collective ones and thus individual utility maximization leads to inefficient outcomes. We assume that there is no functioning central institution which can control individual behavior. Instead, we analyze a system of what we...

In the traditional situation, all transportation companies had their own clients and their own set of transportation orders.In a situation with order sharing, transportation companies mutually share their data on transportation orders.This enables a much better allocation of orders to the...

Taking part in the implementation of a voluntary policy instrument for land use management implies motivational requirements of the targeted landowner. Increasing knowledge on the potential economic, managerial and attitudinal factors helps design incentives in accordance and facilitates an...