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Tell the truth or not? : the Montero mechanism for emissions control at work
Requate, Tilman; Camacho-Cuena, Eva; Ch'ng, Kean Siang; … - 2019
We experimentally test the truth-telling mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) for eliciting firms' abatement costs. We compare this mechanism with two well-known alternative allocation mechanisms, free and costly allocation of permits at the Pigouvian price. Controlling for the number of firms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012112503
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Tell the truth or not? The montero mechanism for emissions control at work
Requate, Tilman; Camacho-Cuena, Eva; Ch'ng, Kean Siang; … - In: Journal of environmental economics and management : … 95 (2019), pp. 133-152
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012285713
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Tell the truth or not? The Montero mechanism for emissions control at work
Requate, Tilman; Camacho-Cuena, Eva; Ch'ng, Kean Siang; … - 2019
We experimentally test the truth-telling mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) for eliciting firms' abatement costs. We compare this mechanism with two well-known alternative allocation mechanisms, free and costly allocation of permits at the Pigouvian price. Controlling for the number of firms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012112740
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Tell the truth or not? The Montero mechanism for emissions control at work
Requate, Tilman; Camacho-Cuena, Eva; Ch'ng, Kean Siang; … - 2018
We experimentally test the truth-telling mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) for eliciting firms' abatement costs. We compare this mechanism with two well-known alternative allocation mechanisms, grandfathering and pure auctioning. We conducted 27 treatments with a total of 623 participants,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011787979
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Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may signal the auctioneer's type
Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2013
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by not bidding, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a multitude of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781360
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Negotiating cultures in corporate procurement : conference paper
Rosar, Frank; Müller, Florian - 2014 - (This version: February 5, 2014)
For a repeated procurement problem, we compare two stylized negotiating cultures which differ in how the buyer uses an entrant to exert pressure on the incumbent resembling U.S. style and Japanese style procurement. In each period, the suppliers are privately informed about their production...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010490631
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Inefficient rushes in auctions
Hernando-Veciana, Ángel; Michelucci, Fabio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 1, pp. 273-306
, i.e., the first best, is not implementable. Our first main result is that the open ascending auction is not second best … main result is that the second best can be implemented with a two-round auction used in real-life privatizations. We also … show how this result generalizes using a survival auction with a novel tie-breaking rule. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011855888
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An externality-robust auction : theory and experimental evidence
Bartling, Björn; Netzer, Nick - 2014 - This version: April 2014
An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected … externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have been used to explain overbidding in the second-price auction (SPA). Another … example are cross-shareholdings between companies that compete in an auction. We derive an auction that coincides with the SPA …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360336
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An externality-robust auction : theory and experimental evidence
Bartling, Björn; Netzer, Nick - 2014 - This version: April 2014, First version: November 2013
An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected … externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have been used to explain overbidding in the second-price auction (SPA). Another … example are cross-shareholdings between companies that compete in an auction. We derive an auction that coincides with the SPA …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010347030
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Price formation in a sequential selling mechanism
Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kröger, Sabine - 2005
auction with an additional buyer is conducted. The theoretical model predicts that with risk neutral agents all sales take … place in the auction rendering the negotiation prior to the auction obsolete. An experimental test of the model provides …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365906