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We show that for any roommate market the set of stochastically stable matchings coincides with the set of absorbing matchings. This implies that whenever the core is non-empty (e.g., for marriage markets), a matching is in the core if and only if it is stochastically stable, i.e., stochastic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008860947
Abstract We consider multiple-type housing markets. To capture the dynamic aspect of trade in such markets, we study a dynamic recontracting process similar to the one introduced by Serrano and Volij (2008). First, we analyze the set of recurrent classes of this process as a (non-empty) solution...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008870879
In this note we study von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets for Shapley and Scarf (1974) housing markets. Kawasaki (2010) shows that the set of competitive allocations coincides with the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set based on a farsighted version of antisymmetric weak...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008870897
In the context of resource allocation on the basis of priorities, Ergin (2002) identifies a necessary and sufficient condition on the priority structure such that the student-optimal stable mechanism satisfies a consistency principle. Ergin (2002) formulates consistency as a local property based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008871269
In practice we often face the problem of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., schools, housing, jobs, offices) to agents (e.g., students, homeless, workers, professors) when monetary compensations are not possible. We show that a rule that satisfies consistency, strategy-proofness, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671568
In many economic environments - such as college admissions, student placements at public schools, and university housing allocation - indivisible objects with capacity constraints are assigned to a set of agents when each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671578
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