We impose three conditions on refinements of the Nash equilibria of finite games with perfect recall that select closed connected subsets, called solutions. A. Each equilibrium in a solution uses undominated strategies; B. Each solution contains a quasi-perfect equilibrium; C. The solutions of a...

The paper shows that Perfect Bayesian equilibria need not be unique in the strategic communication game of Crawford and Sobel (1982). First, different equilibrium partitions of the state space can have equal cardinality, despite fixed prior beliefs. Hence, there can be different equilibrium...

The paper is Presidential Address to the North Eastern Economic Association 11th Annual Conference held at the Indian Institute of Technology, Guwahati, India on 18 December 2009. It is an attempt to articulate the conflict situation in the North Eastern Region of India within the framework of...

In the modeling of competition on networks it is usually assumed that users either behave following the Wardrop equilibrium or the Nash equilibrium concept. Nevertheless, in several equilibrium situations, for instance in urban traffic flows, intercity freight flows and telecommunication...

This paper provides a different approach to establish the uniqueness of equilibrium in Tullock con- tests between two players with asymmetric valuations, when the discriminatory power r is between 1 and 2. Our result complements that of Ewerhart (2017) in Ölling up the remaining gap in the...

We establish the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with discontinuous payoffs where the set of feasible actions of each player varies, also in a discontinuous fashion, as a function of the actions of the other players. Such games are used in modeling abstract economies and other...

I introduce an undominated coalition-proof Nash equilibrium that is unique and is able to select undominated Nash equilibria in a quasi-supermodular game with a strict single-crossing property and monotonic externalities