We use high-quality panel data on corruption convictions, new panels of assistant U.S. attorneys and relative public sector wages, and careful attention to the consequences of modeling endogeneity to estimate the impact of prosecutorial resources on criminal convictions of those who undertake...

This paper examines whether voters’ subjective forecasts of the economy and their assessments of their individual unemployment risk affect how they vote, or if their forecasts reflect, rather than cause, their partisan leanings. We employ a unique Danish dataset comprising panel surveys, a...

Theoretically, this paper draws on political agency theory to formulate hypotheses. Empirically, it shows that political institutions have a role in explaining the prevalence of political corruption in American states. In the states, a set of democracies where the rule of law is relatively well...

Many believe and argue that fiscal, or budgetary, transparency has large, positive effects on fiscal performance. However, the evidence linking transparency and fiscal policy outcomes is less compelling. To analyze the effects of fiscal transparency on public debt accumulation, we present a...

The financial crisis affected citizens across developed economies, heightening economic insecurity. While macro-economic indicators in the US and, if more slowly, in Europe are picking up, many households continue to be deeply affected by wealth and credit echoes from the crisis: wealth...

This paper examines empirically how transparency of the budget process affects fiscal rules and incentives for fiscal gimmickry or creative accounting in the European Union. Using stock-flow adjustment data for EU countries from 1990-2007, we show that pressure from a deficit limit rule as in...

This paper shows how Danish administrative register data can be combined with survey data at the person level and be used to validate information collected in the survey. Register data are collected by automatic third party reporting and the potential errors associated with the two data sources...

Are politicians held accountable for bad governance? Using a unique panel data set on late budgets in US state governments, we investigate whether voters react to bad fiscal governance by penalizing political actors involved in the budgetary process at election day. We find that legislatures...

We use survey responses by firms to examine the firm-level determinants and effects of political influence, their perception of corruption and prevalence of bribe paying. We find that: (a) measures of political influence and corruption/bribes are uncorrelated at the firm level; (b) firms that...