This paper studies incentives for the interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests. Considered are unfair contests, i.e., contests in which, subject to activity conditions, one player (the favorite) is interim always more likely to win than the other...

This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests. Provided that the contest is uniformly asymmetric, full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome. This is so because the weakest type of the...

This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests. Provided that the contest is uniformly asymmetric, full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome. This is so because the weakest type of the...

This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests with two-sided incomplete information. Private information may concern marginal cost, valuations, and ability. Our main result says that, if the contest is uniformly...

We propose a model of competitive attention based on two key premises: i) People have limited information processing capacities and ii) consideration sets are formed according to relative salience. The equilibrium predictions we obtain can help to understand, and connect, diverse empirical...

In Erfüllung des Postulats Caroni "Faires Verfahren beim Zugang zu geschlossenen Märkten des Bundes" (15.3398) hat das SECO eine externe Studie im Auftrag gegeben. Diese Studie analysiert die Zugangsverfahren zu 16 unterschiedliche Märkte des Bundes, um zu bestimmen, ob sie die Prinzipien der...