We study an economy where intermediaries facilitate exchange between a supplier and consumers. The set of feasible transactions is characterized by a network and an efficient auction protocol sets prices. We examine trading networks compatible with a free-entry equilibrium. There is under-entry...

This paper develops a model of intermediated exchange with budget-constrained traders who are embedded in a trading network. An experimental investigation confirms the theory's baseline predictions. Traders adopt monotone strategies with higher-budget intermediaries offering to pay more for...

We investigate equilibrium bidding in first-price auctions with asymmetric reserve prices. For example, the auctioneer may set a low reserve price for one subset of bidders and a high reserve price for others. When used to pursue a distributional objective, lowering the reserve price for some...

Consider a first-price, sealed-bid auction with interdependent valuations and private budget constraints. Focusing on the two-bidder case, we identify new sufficient conditions for the existence of a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. In equilibrium, agents may adopt discontinuous bidding...