We study a coordination game among agents on a network, who choose whether or not to take an action in an uncertain environment that yields value increasing in the actions of neighbors. We develop an algorithm that fully characterizes the equilibrium partitions (coordination sets) and thresholds...

Because of its impacts on democracy, there is an important debate on whether the recent trends towards greater use of social media increases or decreases (political) polarization. One challenge for understanding this issue is how social media affects the equilibrium prevalence of different types...

This paper studies information acquisition and use in network games. The network structure incorporates both strategic complements (positive links) and substitutes (negative links). An information-use game played on a correlation-adjusted network is derived. Equilibrium inefficiencies in both...

We propose a deterrence mechanism that utilizes insider information contained in criminal networks. Under this mechanism, a suspect, identified by the regulator, can nominate a connected person from the network for the crime, and only the more severe offender is penalized. We show theoretically...

We develop a model of competing diffusions of goods on a social network. There are two types of goods and individuals: mass-market (more prevalent) and niche-market. We start with a general threshold rule and show that multiple equilibria prevail. Then, when everyone uses a single friend...

When can an interest group exploit ideological and affective polarization between political parties to its advantage? We study a model where an interest group credibly promises payments to legislators conditional on voting for its favoured policy. Legislators value voting as their friends within...