There is an ongoing debate on the appropriate auction design for competitive electricity balancing markets. Uniform (UPA)and discriminatory price auctions (DPA), the prevalent designs in use today, are assumed to have different properties with regard to prices and effciencies. These properties...

This paper conducts an empirical analysis of risk premiums in the German day-ahead Electricity Wholesale Market. We compare hourly price data of the European Energy Exchange (EEX) auction and of the continuous over-the-counter (OTC) market taking place prior to EEX. As OTC price data are not...

We study two electricity markets connected by a fixed amount of crossborder capacity. The total amount of capacity is known to all electricity traders and allocated via an auction. The capacity allocated to each bidder in the auction remains private information. We assume that traders are faced...

This paper conducts an empirical analysis of risk premiums in the German day-ahead Electricity Wholesale Market. We compare hourly price data of the European Energy Exchange (EEX) auction and of the continuous over-the-counter (OTC) market taking place prior to EEX. As OTC price data are not...

We study two electricity markets connected by a fixed amount of crossborder capacity. The total amount of capacity is known to all electricity traders and allocated via an auction. The capacity allocated to each bidder in the auction remains private information. We assume that traders are faced...