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We investigate the (unintended) effects of bank executive compensation regulation. Capping the share of variable compensation spurred average turnover rates driven by CEOs at poorly performing banks. Other than that, banks‘ responses to raise fixed compensation sufficed to retain the vast...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012321323
We investigate the (unintended) effects of bank executive compensation regulation. Capping the share of variable compensation did not induce an executive director exodus from EU banking because banks raised fixed compensation sufficiently to retain executives. However, risk-adjusted bank...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011937866
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We show that around one third of executive directors on the boards of national supervisory authorities (NSA) in European banking have an employment history in the financial industry. The appointment of executives without a finance background associates with negative valuation effects....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014451363
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Theoretically, bank's loan monitoring activity hinges critically on its capitalisation. To proxy for monitoring intensity, we use changes in borrowers' investment following loan covenant violations, when creditors can intervene in the governance of the firm. Exploiting granular bank-firm...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011960127
Based on detailed regulatory intervention data among German banks during 1994-2008, we test if supervisory measures affect the likelihood and the timing of bank recovery. Severe regulatory measures increase both the likelihood of recovery and its duration while weak measures are insignificant....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014404319
We investigate the (unintended) effects of bank executive compensation regulation. Capping the share of variable compensation spurred average turnover rates driven by CEOs at poorly performing banks. Other than that, banks' responses to raise fixed compensation sufficed to retain the vast...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012321383
We show that around one third of executive directors on the boards of national supervisory authorities (NSA) in European banking have an employment history in the financial industry. The appointment of executives without a finance background associates with negative valuation effects....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014456429