In antitrust cases in which the defendant (a cartel or a dominant supplier) overcharged a firm, the defendant often claims: (1) the firm passed on the higher price to its customers, (2) its sales volume did not decrease materially, (3) so it lost little profit—the damages are small. The cases...

We study an Hotelling-type model with income constrained consumers. As income constraints bind, the subgame perfect equilibrium locations exhibit intermediate differentiation and reduced prices. When income becomes more restrictive, firms settle on the socially optimal degree of differentiation....

I analyse a market with asymmetric information and interdependent values. Accessing the market is costly and stochastic, e.g. requires lobbying, licences, search or attention. For a range of parameter values, there is a unique equilibrium in which higher gains from trade reduce trading,...

I analyse a market with asymmetric information, interdependent values and trade frictions. The frictions can be reduced at a cost, e.g. by increasing attention, search, lobbying or computing power. For some parameters, there is a unique equilibrium in which an increase in the gains from trade...

This paper proves Li (2009) unawareness structure equivalent to the single-agent propositionally generated logic of awareness of Fagin and Halpern (1988). For any model of one type one can construct a model of the other type describing the same belief and awareness. Li starts from an agent...

Infi nite hierarchies of awareness and belief arise in games with unawareness, similarly to belief hierarchies in standard games. A natural question is whether each hierarchy describes the player's awareness of the hierarchies of other players and beliefs over these, or whether the reasoning can...