We consider observable restrictions on asset prices in an exchange economy with general preferences and endowments and an asset structure that may be incomplete. - Asset prices satisfy the martingale property with respect to a class of probability measures; however, generically, not with respect...

This paper evaluates the extent of regulation in a democracy with political corruption. Elected politicians can restrict entry of firms in exchange for bribes from entrepreneurs. Full liberalisation implies free entry and allocative efficiency and is supported by a majority of voters. Voters...

This paper develops a theory of policy myopia. Policy myopia arises when rational voters set performance standards that allow elected politicians to distort the portfolio of public investments towards short-term investments. We show that the fact that voters cannot observe immediately how much...

We study equilibrium retention rules in a dynamic common agency game. The decision to reappoint or not is made by a committee consisting of two principals: the retention decision is uncertain if the two principals disagree. We demonstrate that all equilibrium paths exhibit what we call strategic...

Holmstrom (1982) considered a group of agents who jointly produce some output and showed that if the agents are required to balance the budget then the first best, or Pareto efficient, allocation cannot be obtained as an equilbrium relative to any sharing rule. Recent research on risk-neutral...

We analyse the production of knowledge in research teams. Individuals put in effort, which is not enforcable. Effort increases the probability of a successful outcome. Research with enforcable effort displays increasing returns to scale; these scale economies are limited, or even reversed, by the...