In the context of repeated public good contribution games, we experimentally investigate the impact of democratic punishment, when members of a group decide by majority voting whether to inflict punishment on another member, relative to individual peer-to-peer punishment. Democratic punishment...

This paper develops a theoretical model based on theories of equilibrium selection in order to predict success rates in threshold public goods games, i.e., the probability with which a group of players provides enough contribution in sum to exceed a predefined threshold value. For this purpose,...

We use a limited information environment to mimic the state of confusion in an experimental, repeated public goods game. The results show that reinforcement learning leads to dynamics similar to those observed in standard public goods games. However, closer inspection shows that individual decay...

This paper experimentally explores how the enforcement of cooperative behavior in a social dilemma is facilitated through institutional as well as emotional mechanisms. Recent studies emphasize the importance of negatively valued emotions, such as anger, which motivate individuals to punish free...

This paper studies the effect of introducing costly partner selection for the voluntary contribution to a public good. Subjects participate in six sequences of five rounds of a twoperson public good game in partner design. At the end of each sequence, subjects can select a new partner out of six...

We use a limited information environment to mimic the state of confusion in an experimental, repeated public goods game. The results show that reinforcement learning leads to dynamics similar to those observed in standard public goods games. However, closer inspection shows that individual decay...