We study the optimal dynamics of incentives for a manager whose ability to generate cash .ows changes stochastically with time and is his private information. We show that, in general, the power of incentives (or "pay for performance") may either increase or decrease with tenure. However, risk...

We study the role of information exchange, leadership and coordination in team or partnership structures. For this purpose, we view individuals jointly engaging in productive processes-a "team"-as endowed with individual and privately held information on the joint production process. Once...

Es wird untersucht, wie ein System privater Versicherungen gegen das Risiko der Arbeitslosigkeit beschaffen sein sollte. Zu dem Zweck wird ein Trennsystem vorgeschlagen, das Arbeitnehmern und Arbeitgebern gleichermaßen Anreize zur Verminderung von Arbeitslosigkeit gibt. Für die Arbeitnehmer...

The issue of whether unemployment benefits should increase or decrease over the unemployment spell is analyzed in a tractable model allowing moral hazard, adverse selection and hidden saving. Analytical results show that when the search productivity of unemployed is constant over the...