Voluntary agreements are an important environmental policy instrument. In the paper some examples are discussed and the structure and mechanisms of voluntary agreements are analyzed using a strategic game approach. In the simple strategic game with only one abatement technology, there is a...

This paper deals with the cost efficiency of target-based voluntary agreements for reducing industrial pollution. These agreements are contracts between a public body and an industrial association including the collective commitment of the industrial sector to reach a pollution abatement...

Recently, attention has turned to the use of voluntary agreements between regulators and polluters as an alternative to mandatory approaches based on regulation or legislation. Voluntary agreements have the potential to reduce compliance costs by allowing greater flexibility and to reduce...

Voluntary agreements with polluting industries are becoming a popular alternative to traditional environmental regulation. One reason may be that voluntary agreements can reduce compliance costs of polluting industries. In this paper we develop a family of simple policy formulation and...

Voluntary Agreements (VAs) are becoming increasingly prominent in many countries as a policy instrument for achieving improvements in the environmental performance of industry. They aim to encourage industry led initiatives to set and meet environmental goals, to raise the environmental profile...

This paper describes the fiscal structure of a community as an equilibrium of a non-cooperative game where members of different pressure groups - characterised by conflicting interests - compete to get distributive gains. Their interaction is regulated by a constitution which sets the electoral...

This paper develops a framework for the analysis of gatekeeping in tax enforcement, whereby independent auditors are assigned the duty of certifying taxpayers' reports. The equilibrium of the market for gatekeepers' services is characterised, as well as taxpayers' and auditors' optimal...

In this paper, we analyse tax harmonisation in the framework of two asymmetric countries, differing with respect to their capital-labour endowments. In the first part, we analyse how national fiscal policies are decided when countries play a non-cooperative game. At the Nash equilibrium,...