These slides summarize the theoretical literature on horizontal common ownership concentration and its impact on competition, as presented at the FTC's hearings on common ownership and competition in December 2018. They are primarily based on this literature review:...

This slide deck reviews the extant empirical literature on common ownership concentration on firm behavior, innovation, and product market outcomes, as presented at the FTC hearings on common ownership and competition in December 2018. It is primarily based on this literature review:...

A firm's incentives to innovate deteriorate when other firms benefit from its R&D activities without incurring a cost. We show under which conditions common ownership of firms can mitigate this impediment to corporate innovation, and test the model's empirical predictions. Common ownership...

Kennedy, O'Brien, Song, and Waehrer (2017) replicate the panel results of Azar, Schmalz and Tecu (forthcoming), but argue on theoretical grounds that the estimates should not be interpreted as anti-competitive effects of common ownership. They then develop and estimate alternative models and...

Many natural competitors are jointly held by a small set of large institutional investors. In the US airline industry, taking common ownership into account implies increases in market concentration that are 10 times larger than what is “presumed likely to enhance market power” by antitrust...

We construct and analyze a new data set on U.S. corporate ownership to study how the inclusion of blockholders' and corporate insiders' holdings affects the measurement of common ownership among America's largest publicly traded firms. Including blockholders’ and insiders’ holdings reveals...

This paper provides a framework for evaluating policy proposals aimed at invigorating competition and improving corporate governance amid a high and increasing level of common ownership of product market competitors. In particular, I propose that any effective proposal must have the effect of...

We show theoretically and empirically that executives are paid less for their own firm’s performance and more for their rivals’ performance if an industry’s firms are more commonly owned by the same set of investors. Higher common ownership also leads to higher unconditional total pay. We...

This chapter studies the votes of institutional investors on shareholder resolutions instructing corporations to mitigate climate change externalities. Our sample includes 238 US fund families that voted on 14,409 different shareholder resolutions at 2,700 companies over the period from 2013 to...