I show that it is optimal to separate non-benevolent regulators when regulated projects are large. Separation prevents regulators from coordinating to appropriate all of the agent's informational rent when they know the type of the latter; therefore, there is a trade-off between saving on...

Purpose: Recent models in firm theory assume that problems have to be solved for production to take place and that knowledge is the main input for problem-solving. This paper characterizes the relationship between the predictability of production prcesses and investment in knowledge....

In a repeated unobserved endowment economy in which agents negotiate long- term contracts with a financial intermediary, we study the implications of the interaction between incentive compatibility and participation constraints for risk sharing. In particular, we assume that after a default...

In a repeated unobserved endowment economy in which agents negotiate long-term contracts with a financial intermediary, we study the implications of the interaction between incentive compatibility and participation constraints for risk sharing. In particular, we assume that after a default...

In an endowment economy in which agents negotiate long-term contracts with a financial intermediary, we study the implication of the interaction between incentive compatibility and participation constraints for risk sharing. In particular, we assume that after a default episode, agents consume...