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I show that it is optimal to separate non-benevolent regulators when regulated projects are large. Separation prevents regulators from coordinating to appropriate all of the agent's informational rent when they know the type of the latter; therefore, there is a trade-off between saving on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011858462
-enforceable private contracts (regulation). However, because this mechanism is costly, its effectiveness depends on the aggregate … institutions and regulation is delayed for the later stages. At this point of time, the hold-up problem is solved and this spurs …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343845
provide higher quality services to all consumers. The externality renders the market outcome inefficient. Price regulation …, price regulation should be accompanied by licensing arrangements that cap the number of experts in the market. Our theory … provides a novel rationale for the wide-spread use of price regulation and licensing in real-world markets for expert services. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012431181
Regulators and the firms they regulate interact repeatedly. Over the course of these interactions, the regulator collects data that contains information about the firm's id- iosyncratic private characteristics. This paper studies the case in which the regulator uses information gleaned from past...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012024566
all, in a sense to be made precise. -- Asymmetric Information ; Learning by Doing ; Regulation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003892452
that the person on whom the regulation is directly incident — the principal — is not intrinsically biased. I also show that … the regulation can be counter-productive if it attempts to enforce perfect fairness (the first-best allocation) when that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014035633
Abstract We develop a tractable model of competitive insurance markets with a continuum of types and exogenous restrictions on the set of allowed contracts. Our model nests, as special cases, the market for lemons of Akerlof (1970) and the unrestricted contracts setting of Rothschild and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013306176
public regulation, this can take the form of producing a more honest or better-behaved regulatory agent in a government that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012775836
We analyze a principal-supervisor-two-agent hierarchy with soft information. The supervisor may be inefficient such that a noisy signal on the agents’ effort levels is observed. On one hand, the agents require risk premiums to work due to the noisy signal. On the other hand, the supervisor and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014033781
Agencies possess enormous regulatory discretion. This discretion allows executive branch agencies in particular to insulate their decisions from presidential review by raising the costs of such review. They can do so, for example, through variations in policymaking form, cost-benefit analysis...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014161480