This paper analyzes market discipline in a many-bank economy where contagion and bank runs interact. We present a model with differently-informed depositors, where those depositors that are more informed have incentives to monitor banks’ investments. It is shown that when banks are...

We analyze an overlapping generations economy where agents interact to share liquidity risk. We show that a pure exchange economy has excessive trade in equilibrium, and that intergenerational financial intermediaries reduce the number of interactions by catering to clienteles with uncorrelated...

We compare the call auction mechanisms of two major European stock exchanges. The French Euronext auctions disclose five levels of limit orders and have fixed ending times. The German Xetra auctions only disclose the virtual clearing price and volume, and have random ending times. For a sample...

We analyze an overlapping generations economy where agents interact to share liquidity risk. We show that a pure exchange economy has excessive trade in equilibrium, and that intergenerational financial intermediaries reduce the number of interactions by catering to clienteles with uncorrelated...

We compare the call auction mechanisms of two major European stock exchanges. The French Euronext auctions disclose five levels of limit orders and have fixed ending times. The German Xetra auctions only disclose the virtual clearing price and volume, and have random ending times. For a sample...

Continuously monitored down-and-out calls and up-and-out puts have become very popular during the last decade, mainly because they can be interpreted as simple leveraged positions. Their deltas stay close to unity and their Greeks are small, particularly in low interest rate environments....

How much information does an auctioneer want bidders to have in a private value environment? We address this question using a novel approach to ordering information structures based on the property that in private value settings more information leads to a more disperse distribution of buyers’...

We consider extensive-form games in which the information structure is not known and ask how much of that structure can be inferred from the distribution on action profiles generated by player strategies. One game is said to observationally imitate another when the distribution on action...

This paper develops a discrete-time general equilibrium model of insurance using standard techniques of intertemporal finance. The underlying source of uncertainty is modeled as a marked point process. The paper begins by characterizing Walrasian equilibrium on the event tree generated by the...