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Contracting in hierarchical platforms

Rong, Jianxin; Wang, Dazhong - In: Economics letters 226 (2023), pp. 1-7

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014312420

Continuous-time incentives in hierarchies

Hubert, Emma - In: Finance and stochastics 27 (2023) 3, pp. 605-661

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014328987

Altruism, Social Norms and Incentive Contract Design

Abernethy, Margaret A. - 2020

We study theoretically and empirically the relation between altruism preferences and incentive contract design …. Theoretically, we extend Fischer and Huddart (2008) to investigate how social norms reinforce altruism preferences, thus affecting … of an organization's work climate to capture managers' altruism preferences. Using data collected from a sample of 557 …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012857257

Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication

Bester, Helmut; Strausz, Roland - 2004 - Version 1.3, December 2004

This paper provides new analytical tools for studying principal-agent problems with adverse selection and limited commitment. By allowing the principal to use general communication devices we overcome the literature's common, but overly restrictive focus on one-shot, direct communication. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010361996

Designing contracts for the global fund : lessons from the theory of incentives

Wren-Lewis, Liam - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011460280

Optimal incentive contracts to avert firm relocation

Pollrich, Martin; Schmidt, Robert C. - 2014

A unilateral policy intervention by a country (such as the introduction of an emission price) can induce firms to relocate to other countries. We analyze a dynamic game where a regulator offers contracts to avert relocation of a firm in each of two periods. The firm can undertake a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010408009

An optimal incentive contract to avert firm relocation : conference paper

Pollrich, Martin; Schmidt, Robert C. - 2014 - Preliminary and incomplete version

In a globalized economy, firms move production to other countries without turning a hair. A local policy maker who seeks to avert relocation faces a dynamic problem - incentivizing the firm to remain in its home country today does not guarantee that the firm also stays in the future. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010482509

An optimal incentive contract to avert firm relocation under unilateral environmental regulation : conference paper

Schmidt, Robert C.; Pollrich, Martin; Stiel, Caroline - 2013 - This version: February 14, 2013, preliminary and incomplete

The unilateral introduction of an emissions price can induce firms to relocate to other countries with less stringent environmental regulation. However, firms may be able to reduce the emissions costs in their home country by investing into low-carbon technologies or equipment (abatement...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343783

A person-organization discontinuity in contract perception : why corporations can get away with breaking contracts but individuals cannot

Haran, Uriel - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 59 (2013) 12, pp. 2837-2853

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010234707

CEO compensation : evidence from the field

Edmans, Alex; Gosling, Tom; Jenter, Dirk - 2021

We survey directors and investors on the objectives, constraints, and determinants of CEO pay. 67% of directors would sacrifice shareholder value to avoid controversy on CEO pay, implying they face significant constraints other than participation and incentive compatibility. These constraints...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012584217