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Financial incentives and earnings of disability insurance recipients : evidence from a notch design
Ruh, Philippe; Staubli, Stefan - In: American economic journal : a journal of the American … 11 (2019) 2, pp. 269-300
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012012267
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Financial incentives and earnings of Disability Insurance recipients : evidence from a notch design
Ruh, Philippe; Staubli, Stefan - 2018
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011934036
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Financial incentives and earnings of disability insurance recipients : evidence from a notch design
Ruh, Philippe; Staubli, Stefan - In: Essays in applied labor economics, (pp. 119-158). 2017
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011787561
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Financial incentives and earnings of disability insurance recipients : evidence from a notch design
Ruh, Philippe; Staubli, Stefan - 2018
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011896060
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Financial Incentives and Earnings of Disability Insurance Recipients: Evidence from a Notch Design
Ruh, Philippe; Staubli, Stefan - 2018
Most countries reduce Disability Insurance (DI) benefits for beneficiaries earning above a specified threshold. Such an earnings threshold generates a discontinuous increase in tax liability – a notch – and creates an incentive to keep earnings below the threshold. Exploiting such a notch in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011931632
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Financial Incentives and Earnings of Disability Insurance Recipients : Evidence from a Notch Design
Ruh, Philippe - 2018
Most countries reduce Disability Insurance (DI) benefits for beneficiaries earning above a specified threshold. Such an earnings threshold generates a discontinuous increase in tax liability--a notch--and creates an incentive to keep earnings below the threshold. Exploiting such a notch in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012452891
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Financial Incentives and Earnings of Disability Insurance Recipients : Evidence from a Notch Design
Ruh, Philippe - 2018
Most countries reduce Disability Insurance (DI) benefits for beneficiaries earning above a specified threshold. Such an earnings threshold generates a discontinuous increase in tax liability – a notch – and creates an incentive to keep earnings below the threshold. Exploiting such a notch in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012914335
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Financial Incentives and Earnings of Disability Insurance Recipients : Evidence from a Notch Design
Ruh, Philippe - 2018
Most countries reduce Disability Insurance (DI) benefits for beneficiaries earning above a specified threshold. Such an earnings threshold generates a discontinuous increase in tax liability—a notch—and creates an incentive to keep earnings below the threshold. Exploiting such a notch in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012914698
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Tightening the purse strings : the effect of stricter DI eligibility criteria on labor supply
Staubli, Stefan - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008667305
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Tightening the purse strings : the effect of stricter DI eligibility criteria on labor supply
Staubli, Stefan - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003941098