below the threshold. Exploiting such a notch in Austria, we provide transparent and credible identification of the effect of … financial incentives on DI beneficiaries' earnings. Using rich administrative data, we document large and sharp bunching at the …

policy parameters: (i) DI eligibility rules and (ii) DI benefits. Causal evidence from two DI reforms in Austria generate … lower DI benefits. Stricter DI eligibility rules generate lower income losses (earnings + transfers), particularly at the … lower end of the income distribution. Hence, to roll back the Austrian DI program, policy makers should implement tighter DI …

policy parameters: (i) DI eligibility rules and (ii) DI benefits. Causal evidence from two DI reforms in Austria generate … lower DI benefits. Stricter DI eligibility rules generate lower income losses (earnings + transfers), particularly at the … lower end of the income distribution. Hence, to roll back the Austrian DI program, policy makers should implement tighter DI …

below the threshold. Exploiting such a notch in Austria, we provide transparent and credible identification of the effect of … financial incentives on DI beneficiaries' earnings. Using rich administrative data, we document large and sharp bunching at the …

lifecycle work disability risk, (2) strong and positive income and health gradients in private ODI take-up, and (3) inversely … related income and health gradients in the lifecycle work disability risk. Simulations illustrate that policy reforms to lower … administrative costs have the greatest potential to foster take-up and flatten its income and health gradients …