-run climate feedbacks. Our non-certainty-equivalent rule for the SCC incorporates precaution, risk insurance, and climate … different aversions to risk and intertemporal fluctuations, convex damages, uncertainties in economic growth, atmospheric carbon …We use perturbation methods to derive a rule for the optimal risk-adjusted social cost of carbon (SCC) that …

perturbation theory to derive an approximate tractable expression for this cost adjusted for climatic and economic risk. We allow … for different aversion to risk and intertemporal fluctuations, skewness and dynamics in the risk distributions of climate … sensitivity and the damage ratio, and correlated shocks. We identify prudence, insurance, and exposure effects, reproduce earlier …

-run climate feedbacks. Our non-certainty-equivalent rule for the SCC incorporates precaution, risk insurance, and climate … different aversions to risk and intertemporal fluctuations, convex damages, uncertainties in economic growth, atmospheric carbon …We use perturbation methods to derive a rule for the optimal risk-adjusted social cost of carbon (SCC) that …

its evolution with economic growth. The social discount rate (SDR) should be adjusted to account for intragenerational and … intergenerational inequality aversion and for risk aversion. If growth increases (reduces) intra-generational inequality, the SDR is …

perturbation theory to derive an approximate tractable expression for this cost adjusted for climatic and economic risk. We allow … for different aversion to risk and intertemporal fluctuations, skewness and dynamics in the risk distributions of climate … sensitivity and the damage ratio, and correlated shocks. We identify prudence, insurance, and exposure effects, reproduce earlier …

shows how carbon, temperature, and economic dynamics quantify the optimal mitigation effort. The model's descriptive power …-form expressions of welfare loss from shocks and epistemological uncertainty identify the interaction of (intertemporal) risk attitude …

We study a commons problem under uncertainty, where individual actions affect the risk of a future damage event. We … show that for risk-averse agents, an extra risk on the amount of the damage induces more precautionary actions in Nash … equilibrium. Similarly, for prudent agents an extra risk in all states of the world induces more precautionary actions in Nash …