We study optimal compensation contracts that (i) are designed to address a joint moral hazard and adverse selection problem and that (ii) are based on performance measures which may be manipulated by the agent at a cost. In the model, a manager is privately informed about his productivity prior...

We study a dynamic model of earnings quality and earnings management in which firms take into account long- and short-term considerations when reporting earnings. In addition to providing predictions about the time series properties of earnings quality and reporting bias, the model offers a...

We study social learning and information transmission in a sender-receiver game wherein senders may be attacked (``cancelled'') for challenging the status-quo beliefs. We find that cancellations (and self-censorship) don't arise unless there is a positive probability the receiver gains a direct...

This paper studies the effect of performance feedback on tournament outcomes, when a possibly dishonest principal may manipulate the agents' expectations to stimulate their effort. Under plausible circumstances, an increase in the principal's propensity to tell the truth (i.e., integrity)...