competition increases (decreases) incentives to invent following Arrow (Schumpeter) based on product market features …

patents granted by "lenient" examiners. These examiners issue patents that are more likely to be litigated by both PAEs and …

dominant means of transfer to the private sector. However, the strong licensee incentives generated by exclusive academic … exclusive license appears to be a signpost pointing out commercially relevant innovation pathways that nonlicensees follow with …

reduces the incentives to exert effort in R&D activities. Then, drawing on the signaling role of patents highlighted by the … patentability standards at PTOs (Patent and Trademark Offices awarding so-called bad patents), not only “false innovators” have the … chance of being granted patents but also, and more interestingly, “true innovators” are forced to patent more intensively …

This paper examines the impact of government assistance through R&D grants on innovation output for firms in New … the world while its effects on process innovation and any product innovation are relatively much weaker. Moreover, there …

build a model in which monopolistic exploitation does not arise, but the property rights granted from patents still give … description of the formation of knowledge externalities. In our framework a benevolent government buys immediately new patents in …

Innovation occurs within ... …

patents as compared to non-academic patents, owned by large firms based in Sweden. One finding is that academic patents have a …-academic patents. In other words, patents belonging to firms' core technologies have significantly higher value, regardless of whether … they are academic or non-academic patents. The above results indicate that the technological profile of firms is an …

This paper analyzes the optimal protection strategy for an innovator of a complex innovation who faces the risk of … imitation by a competitor. We suppose that the innovation can be continuously fragmented into sub-innovations. We characterize … fraction of the innovation once. We also study the optimal dynamic patenting policy in a soft novelty regime, when the …

problems shape the optimal mechanism: how to provide a potential challenger with adequate incentives to look for the defeating … search. Partial collusion-deterrence preserves the subsequent searcher's incentives and reduces the cost to fight collusion …