's ambiguity aversion. -- Dynamic contract ; principal-agent model ; ambiguity aversion ; continuous time … principal is ambiguity averse, and designs a contract which is robust to the worst case effort cost process. Ambiguity divides … the contract into two regions. After sufficiently high performance, the agent reaches the over-compensation region, where …

be implemented even if the supervisor's preferences are unknown. The corresponding optimal contract is similar to what we …

endowment shock is small enough, the optimal contract prevents agents from reaching autarky tomorrow and, thus, from being …

We relate the design of contract law to the process of development. In this paper, contract law defines which private … levels of effort and trading among agents. The solution to this problem requires a social contract which meets two conditions …: (i) an economywide delegate (judge) responsible for the enforcement of the social contract and (ii) a set of non …

requires the use of an appropriate incentive contract so as to realign his interests with those of the principal. The parties … of the optimal flexible contract both when the parties have sharp probabilistic beliefs over the possible events in which … risk aversion, the higher the agency costs for delegation and hence the less profitable is a flexible contract versus a …

We propose a model to analyze how evidence-based rulings affect incentive contract formation and welfare. A contract … arbitrators, and discuss their specific roles in contract enforcement …