contract is collateralized when in some state, some portion of the borrower's net worth is forfeited to the lender. We show …

show that a revenue-maximizing government can optimally trade-off direct subsidies for capital investment against the right …

derive the optimal contract for both experimentation and production when the agent has private information about his … asymmetric information is endogenously determined by the length of the experimentation stage. An optimal contract uses the length …

seller's valuation and the buyer's valuation, and the buyer evaluates each contract according to its worst-case performance … over a set of probability distributions. This paper demonstrates that the contract that maximizes the minimum payoff over … contract for any given probability distribution is a posted price, which induces bunching. Using the e-contamination model …

maximizing contracts in dynamic principal-agent models. The FO-approach works when the resulting FO-optimal contract satisfies a …-optimal contract if the frequency of interactions is sufficiently high (or equivalently if the discount factor, time horizon and …

privately held and is unknown to the firm. By explicitly characterizing the optimal multilateral contract, we demonstrate how …

We study a contract design setting in which the contracting parties cannot commit not to renegotiate previous contract … informed agent if, having observed the agent's contract choice, the principal can offer a new menu of contracts in its place … standard contract is robust to renegotiation. …

-proof contract as a Markov Perfect Equilibrium(MPE) of the game, prove such a MPE exists, and characterize the optimal contractvia an … extended Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman system. We solve the optimal contract inclosed form when the discount functions of the selves …

-telling incentive to herself, which, in turn, lowers the cost of inducing the agent to accept the contract …

types, we find that the optimal contract may be very simple, paying the supervisor a flat wage independent of his type and … his evaluation of the agent's effort. Such a contract induces the neutral type of supervisor to report the agent … performance (leniency bias) may be the outcome of an optimal contract under informational asymmetries …