weaker for managers with longer tenure. I consider an optimal incentive contract for money managers, and I provide an … compensation. In the optimal contract, flows become more sensitive to performance when the manager faces stronger incentives from … the compensation contract. With learning, the manager's incentives become stronger after good performance, so that a …

investment decisions. The analyst's ability is privately known, as is any information she learns over time. The manager wants to … optimal dynamic contract, show that it has several features supported by empirical evidence, and derive novel testable … implications. The fund manager's optimal contract both maximizes the value of information and screens out low-skill analysts by …

generally not optimal in this principal-agent problem. In contrast, we provide conditions under which guaranteed VWAP contracts …

We study the optimal execution problem in a principal-agent setting. A client contracts to purchase a large position … action in that the client cannot directly dictate the dealer’s trades. Rather, she chooses a contract with the goal of … explicitly the optimal weighted-average-price contract: it is symmetric and generally U-shaped over the trading periods. This U …

pressure. Nonetheless, when facing a penalty incentive scheme these individuals are more likely to choose to work with strict … term limits, suggesting that penalty contracts might generate adverse selection problems. …

pressure. Nonetheless, when facing a penalty incentive scheme these individuals are more likely to choose to work with strict … term limits, suggesting that penalty contracts might generate adverse selection problems. …