acting as agents under contract and taking costly actions to acquire information before taking decisions. Limited liability … an additional reason to those in the classic principal-agent literature for using contracts with pay increasing in the … ; principal-agent contracts ; asymmetric information …

criterion. Under quite general conditions, we show that the optimal contract is a "restricted investment contract," in which the … the face of this uncertainty, the principal evaluates any incentive contract she may offer using a maxmin expected utility …

the contract. There are two scenarios. In scenario I, information gathering is a hidden action, while in scenario II, the …

I study the optimal incentive provision in a principal–agent relationship with costly information acquisition by the … information acquisition. The principal designs the contract not only to address an existing incentive problem but also to … implemented by replacing the benchmark debt contract with a debt-with-equity-share contract, such that the agent does not attempt …

explanation. First, the optimal compensation contract creates incentives for the manager to engage in risk-shifting, making her … interests congruent with those of shareholders. Second, because debtholders are negatively affected by risky investment, they …

acting as agents under contract and taking costly actions to acquire information before taking decisions. Limited liability … an additional reason to those in the classic principal-agent literature for using contracts with pay increasing in the …