This study considers evolutionary games with non-uniformly random matching when interaction occurs in groups of n = 2 individuals using pure strategies from a finite strategy set. In such models, groups with different compositions of individuals generally co-exist and the reproductive success...

This paper introduces two new concepts in evolutionary game theory: Nash equilibrium with Group Selection (NEGS) and Evolutionarily Stable Strategy with Group Selection (ESSGS). These concepts generalize Maynard Smith and Price (1973) to settings with arbitrary matching rules, inparticular they...

The present paper shows that the savings motive critically affects the size and sign of scale effects in standard endogenous growth models. If the bequest motive dominates, the scale effect is positive. If the life-cycle motive dominates, the scale effect is ambiguous and may even be negative.

In aggregative games, each player's payoff depends on her own actions and an aggregate of the actions of all the players (for example, sum, product or some moment of the distribution of actions). Many common games in industrial organization, political economy, public economics, and...

In the present paper, an optimal growth model for which transformation possibilities are supposed to be bounded in the short run and unbounded in the long run - maybe due to adjustment costs or accummulation costs - is considered. It is shown that equilibria exist and that equilibrium...