We argue that recent participative budgeting experiments designed to extend agency theory reveal the effects of responsibility, transparency, and accountability. We define these three theoretical constructs and present two experiments designed to isolate their main and interactive effects. In...

We argue that participative budgeting experiments designed to test agency theory predictions reveal the effects of responsibility, transparency, and accountability. We define these accounting constructs and present two experiments designed to isolate their main and interactive effects. In...

Prior archival studies of analysts' forecasts have found evidence for systematic underreaction, systematic overreaction, and systematic optimism bias. Easterwood and Nutt (1999) attempt to reconcile the conflicting evidence by testing the robustness of Abarbanell and Bernard's (1992)...

Researchers in accounting have recently provided evidence of a striking increase in the usefulness of earnings announcements based on stock market price and volume reactions (Beaver et al., 2018; Barron et al., 2018). Price reactions, however, are unable to capture investor disagreement and volume...

In agency theory, offering a flat salary contract under unobservable effort creates a moral hazard problem because the agent is motivated to shirk and provide less than a previously agreed-upon level of effort. We examine a moral solution to this moral hazard problem. In particular, we present a...