This paper documents that firms led by Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) with greater network power and influence are more likely to be subject to securities class action (SCA) lawsuits, and that these lawsuits are more likely to led by institutional investors. Firms with more connected CEOs are...

Equity investors value CEO social capital when pricing firm equity. When CEO social capital is high, the value relevance of the book value of equity declines whereas the value relevance of earnings measures increases. Results are stronger for firms in high-tech industries where information...

Utilizing a hand-collected sample of non-GAAP earnings disclosures from 2003-2016, we investigate the relationship between social capital/network connections of Chief Executive Officer (CEOs) and both their propensity to disclose non-GAAP earnings metrics as well as the quality of the...

We investigate the effects of Audit Committee (AC) networks on the timeliness of financial reporting. Using a sample of 2,198 firms for the period 2002 to 2017, we find that firms led by well-connected ACs have lower audit lag, earnings announcement lag, and filing (10-K) lag. This timeliness is...

We investigate the relationship between CEO compensation and bank default risk predictors to determine if short-term incentives can explain recent excesses in bank risk. We investigate early warning off-site surveillance parameters and expected default frequency (EDF) as well as crisis-related...