Although wealth inequality and choices regarding risky investments are among the most important topics in modern society, experimental studies focusing on this issue remain scarce. In the present study, we try to determine how the increasing visibility of others’ wealth, which is accelerated...

In this paper, we provide a theory of positive and negative sanctions using a game theoretic framework. We approach the question of how to use and combine the stick and the carrot policy from the stand that reward is an incentive system for pulling up the good performers and punishment is an...

The purpose of this study was to determine whether attitudes toward risk and altruism are affected by being in a group or being alone. In contrast to previous economic research on group decision-making, we excluded the effects of group informal discussions, which are thought to be a "black box"...

In this paper, we examine the question of which coalition structures farsighted players form in coalition formation games with externalities. We introduce a stability concept for a coalition structure called a sequentially stable coalition structure. Our concept of domination between two...

We isolate strategic and non-strategic motivations of sanctioning in a repeated public goods game. In two experimental treatments, subjects play the public goods game with the possibility to sanction others. In the STANDARD sanctions treatment, each subject learns about the sanctions received in...

Some new axiomatic characterizations and recursive formulas of the Shapley value are presented. In the results, dual games and the self-duality of the value implicitly play an important role. A set of non-cooperative games which implement the Shapley value on the class of all games is given.

The lexicographic vectors of a balanced game, called here leximals, are used to define a new solution concept, the lexicore, on the cone of balanced games. Properties of the lexicore and its relation with the core on some classes of games are studied. It is shown that on cones of balanced games...

Abstract: We consider price-fee competition in bilateral oligopolies with perfectly-divisible goods, non-expandable infrastructures, concentrated agents on both sides, and constant marginal costs. We define and characterize stable market outcomes. Buyers exclusively trade with the supplier with...