This paper compares the effects of two leadership styles: leading by pre-game communication and leading by example … using an iterated voluntary contribution game. We find that pre-game communication increases the level of individual …-game communication. We also find that the content of pre-game communication has a higher impact on individual decisions than the ex post …

We study communication in a two-player coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria. Prior research demonstrates … that efficient coordination is difficult without communication but obtains regularly with (mandatory) costless pre … communication. Consistent with the introspective character of GW-FI, the fraction of players who achieve efficient coordination by …

findings highlight the fragility of cheap-talk communication and may serve as a guide to refine existing behavioral theories …Charness and Dufwenberg (American Economic Review, June 2011, 1211-1237) have recently demonstrated that cheap-talk … communication raises efficiency in bilateral contracting situations with adverse selection. We replicate their finding and check its …

We study communication in a two-player coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria. Prior research demonstrates … that efficient coordination is difficult without communication but obtains regularly with (mandatory) costless pre … communication. Consistent with the introspective character of GW-FI, the fraction of players who achieve efficient coordination by …

previous "babbling" results. -- cheap talk ; communication ; coordination ; efficient equilibrium ; babbling …Intuitively, we expect that players who are allowed to engage in costless communication before playing a game would be … foolish to agree on an inefficient equilibrium. At the same time, however, such preplay communication has been suggested as a …

among three players. The baseline treatment with no communication shows that the first and second players send significant … amounts and the third player reciprocates. Allowing insider communication between the second and the third players increases … cooperation between these two. Interestingly, there is an external effect of insider communication: the first player who is …

This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication …

This paper studies a mechanism design model where the players and the designer are nodes in a communication network. We … characterize the communication networks (directed graphs) for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive … implementable on a given communication network, in all environments with either common independent beliefs and private values or a …