Narrow search
Showing 81 - 90 of 130,777
Cover Image
Bayesian Persuasion with Lie Detection
Ederer, Florian; Min, Weicheng - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2022
How does lie detection constrain the potential for one person to persuade another to change her action? We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion in which the Receiver can detect lies with positive probability. We show that the Sender lies more when the lie detection probability increases. As...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013210093
Cover Image
Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk : experts vs. quacks
Smirnov, Aleksei; Starkov, Egor - 2019
The paper studies a dynamic communication game in the presence of adverse selection and career concerns. A forecaster …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012123351
Cover Image
Committees of experts in the lab
Renes, Sander; Visser, Bauke - 2018
cheap-talk communication with evaluators. We use the chat among committee members to learn about, e.g., their beliefs about …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011895939
Cover Image
Information Transmission in Nested Sender-Receiver Games
Chen, Ying; Gordon, Sidartha - 2013
centralization and delegation, and (iii) two-way communication with an informed principal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014158276
Cover Image
Who cares when value (mis)reporting may be found out? : an acquiring-a-company experiment with value messages and information leaks
Di Cagno, Daniela; Güth, Werner; Lohse, Tim; Marazzi, … - 2023
We modify the Acquiring-a-Company game to study lying in ultimatum bargaining. Privately informed sellers send messages about the alleged value of their company to potential buyers. Via random information leaks, buyers can learn the true value before proposing a price which the seller finally...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014265847
Cover Image
Truth or efficiency? Communication in a sequential public good game
Serra-Garcia, Marta (contributor);  … - 2008
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003807183
Cover Image
Eliciting private information with noise : the case of randomized response
Blume, Andreas; Lai, Ernest K.; Lim, Wooyoung - 2013
, thus linking game theoretic approaches to randomness in communication with survey practice in the field and a novel …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010201201
Cover Image
Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games : ACDC Rocks When Other Criteria Remain Silent
de Groot Ruiz, Adrian; Offerman, T. J. S.; Onderstal, Sander - 2012
In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a behavioral refinement and stability measure...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014185948
Cover Image
Cheap talk is not cheap: free versus costly communication
Aghadadashli, Hamid; Kirchsteiger, Georg; Legros, Patrick - 2021 - This version: February 23, 2021
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012437059
Cover Image
Coordination in Networks Formation : Experimental Evidence on Learning and Salience
Galizzi, Matteo Maria; Bernasconi, Michele - 2011
coordination problems. We conduct experiments under various conditions which control for salient labeling and learning dynamics …. Contrary to previous experiments, we find that coordination on non-empty Strict Nash equilibria is not an easy task for … significantly helps coordination, but only when subjects are pre-instructed to think of the wheel network as a reasonable way to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014062154