competes with another firm à la Cournot in a second market. We compare treatments where the multi-product firm (i) always …

to form cartels in Cournot markets. As in previous experiments, markets become very competitive when individualized … information is available and participants cannot communicate. In contrast, when communication is possible, results reverse …: Markets become less competitive and cartels become more stable when individualized information is available. We also observe …

Cartels can severely harm social welfare. Competition authorities introduced leniency rules to destabilize existing … cartels and hinder the formation of new ones. Empirically, it is difficult to judge the success of these measures because … functioning cartels are unobservable. Existing experimental studies confirm that a leniency rule indeed reduces cartelization. We …

Cartels can severely harm social welfare. Competition authorities introduced leniency rules to destabilize existing … cartels and hinder the formation of new ones. Empirically, it is difficult to judge the success of these measures because … functioning cartels are unobservable. Existing experimental studies confirm that a leniency rule indeed reduces cartelization. We …

to form cartels in Cournot markets. As in previous experiments, markets become very competitive when individualized … information is available and participants cannot communicate. In contrast, when communication is possible, results reverse …: Markets become less competitive and cartels become more stable when individualized information is available. We also observe …

A usual assumption in the theory of collusion is that cartels are all-inclusive. In contrast, most real-world collusive … experimentally the formation and behavior of partial cartels. The theoretical model is a variation of Bos and Harrington's (2010 … experimental study has two main objectives. The first goal is examine whether partial cartels emerge in the lab at all, and if so …

experiments with written cheap-talk communication between players and we compare them to treatments without the possibility to … tends to go in hand with supra-competitive profits. We illustrate this issue with laboratory data. We run n-firm Cournot … tacitly but that the number of firms does not significantly affect outcomes with communication. As a result, the payoff gain …

We study the role of communication in collusive market sharing. In a series of Cournot oligopoly experiments with …. We find that the effect of communication on the firms' ability to collude depends on the type of information available … strategy, even if stated only once, drives this strong effect. Our results point to the types and contents of communication …

We use experiments to analyze what type of communication is most effective in achieving cooperation in a simple … collusion game. Consistent with the existing literature on communication and collusion, even minimal communication leads to a … strategies, this initial burst of collusion rapidly collapses. When unlimited pre-game communication is allowed via a chat window …

We study the role of communication in collusive market sharing. In a series of Cournot oligopoly experiments with …. We find that the effect of communication on the firms' ability to collude depends on the type of information available … strategy, even if stated only once, drives this strong effect. Our results point to the types and contents of communication …