substantial externality on the rest of the world. We analyze whether the threat of counter-geoengineering technologies capable of … international cooperation. Our game-theoretical model of asymmetric countries allows for a rigorous analysis of the strategic …

substantial externality on the rest of the world. We analyze whether the threat of counter-geoengineering technologies capable of … international cooperation. Our game-theoretical model of asymmetric countries allows for a rigorous analysis of the strategic …

. This raises the important issue of just how such voluntary cooperation might be obtained. In this paper, we explore the …

. This raises the important issue of just how such voluntary cooperation might be obtained. In this paper, we explore the …

. This raises the important issue of just how such voluntary cooperation might be obtained. In this paper, we explore the …

knowledge to trigger appropriate action, but diverging national interests remain the key impediment to cooperation and …. When some countries fail to cooperate, the international community can still forge cooperation,including by realigning … incentives and demonstrating benefit from incremental steps toward full cooperation …

knowledge to trigger appropriate action, but diverging national interests remain the key impediment to cooperation and …. When some countries fail to cooperate, the international community can still forge cooperation, including by realigning … incentives and demonstrating benefit from incremental steps toward full cooperation …